



Non-interference spec.

Intuition: B's exec should not be affected by A. ←



Non-interference:
prop. about 2 exec.
"2-safety prop".

What data is confidential?

What data is observed/exposed?


Approach.

- Deterministic spec.
- Deterministic code.
- Observation func.

$O(\text{principal}, \text{state}) \rightarrow$ subset of state that princ. can observe.

Spec. vs. code obs.

$$O(s_{\text{code}}) \subseteq O(s_{\text{spec}}).$$



$$O(s) = O(s') \\ \downarrow \\ O(c) = O(c').$$

Spec. obs.

$O(p, s_{\text{spec}}) \rightarrow$ p should be able to read this part of s_{spec} ^{is OK}
Implies confid. for $p' \neq p$.

Code obs.


$O(p, s_{\text{code}}) \rightarrow$ externally observable state.
Output to p 's terminal
Packets send to p 's computer.

Proof of non-interference.

Goal: start out in states that have same spec. obs
→ execute * → observe same results at code level.

Assume:
 $O(s_0) = O(s'_0)$

$O(c_0) = O(c'_0)$



Proof step Δ :
 $O(s_2) = O(s'_1)$.

induction

Restriction
from prev.
board.

Goal:
 $O(c_n) = O(c'_n)$.

What if spec OO is wrong?

What if code $O(\cdot)$ is wrong?

